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Abstract
Query autocompletions help users of search engines to
speed up their searches by recommending completions of
partially typed queries in a drop down box. These recom-
mended query autocompletions are usually based on large
logs of queries that were previously entered by the search
engine’s users. Therefore, misinformation entered – either
accidentally or purposely to manipulate the search engine –
might end up in the search engine’s recommendations, po-
tentially harming organizations, individuals, and groups of
people. This paper proposes an alternative approach for
generating query autocompletions by extracting anchor texts
from a large web crawl, without the need to use query logs.
Our evaluation shows that even though query log autocom-
pletions perform better for shorter queries, anchor text au-
tocompletions outperform query log autocompletions for
queries of 2 words or more.
INTRODUCTION
The brutal killing end of May 2020 by Minneapolis po-
lice officers of George Floyd, who was already handcuffed,
laying face down, and did not seem to resist arrest, became
an immediate target of disinformation on the platforms run
by Google and Facebook. Figure 1 shows Google’s auto-
completions for George Floyd early June 2020. Although
it is hard to proof the deliberate manipulation of Google’s
autocompletions in this particular case, we show below that
autocompletions based on previous user interactions have
been shown to contain defamatory, racist, sexist and homo-
phobic information, and there is increasing evidence that
autocompletions are an easy target for spreading fake news
and propaganda.
Figure 1: Example autocompletions
Search engines suggest completions of partially typed
queries to help users speed up their searches, for instance
by showing the suggested completions in a drop down box.
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These query autocompletions enable the user to search faster,
searching for long queries with relatively few key strokes.
Jakobsson [12] showed that for a library information system,
users are able to identify items using as little as 4.3 characters
on average. Query autocompletions are now widely used,
either with a drop down box or as instant results [4]. While
Jakobsson [12] used the titles of documents as completions
of user queries, web search engines today generally use large
logs of queries submitted previously by their users. Using
previous queries seems a common-sense choice: The best
way to predict a query? Use previous queries! Several
scientific studies use the AOL query log provided by Pass et
al. [21] to show that query autocompletion algorithms using
query logs are effective [3, 8, 19, 24, 28]. However, query
autocompletion algorithms that are based on query logs are
problematic in two important ways:
1. They return offensive and damaging results;
2. They suffer from a destructive feedback loop.
We discuss these two problems in the following sections.
Offensive queries and misinformation in query au-
tocompletions
Query autocompletion based on actual user queries may
return offensive results, and there are several examples where
offensive autocompletions hurt organizations or individuals.
For instance in 2010, a French appeals court ordered Google
to remove the word “arnaque”, which translates roughly
as “scam”, from appearing in Google’s autocompletions
for the CNFDI, the Centre National Privé de Formation
a Distance [17]. Google’s defense argued that its tool is
based on an algorithm applied to actual search queries: It
was users that searched for “cnfdi arnaque” that caused the
algorithm to select offensive suggestions. The court however
ruled that Google is responsible for the suggestions that it
generates, and that Google should remove misinformation
that is based on user-generated input of its search engine.
Google lost a similar lawsuit in Italy, where queries for an
unnamed plaintiff’s name were presented with autocomplete
suggestions including “truffatore” (“con man”) and “truffa”
(“fraud”) [18]. In another similar law suite, German’s former
first lady Bettina Wulff sued Google for defamation when
queries for her name completed with terms like “escort” and
“prostitute” [15]. In yet another lawsuit in Japan, Google was
ordered to disable autocomplete results for an unidentified
man who could not find a job because a search for his name
linked him with crimes he was not involved with [5].
Google has since updated its autocompletion results by
filtering offensive completions for person names, no mat-
ter who the person is [29]. But controversies over query
autocompletions remain. A study by Baker and Potts [2]
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highlights that autocompletions produce suggested terms
which can be viewed as racist, sexist or homophobic. Baker
and Pots analyzed the results of over 2,500 query prefixes
and concluded that completion algorithms inadvertently help
to perpetuate negative stereotypes of certain identity groups.
A study by Ray and Ayalon [23] suggests that Google plays
an important role in the spread of age and gender stereo-
types via its autocomplete algorithm. And despite Google
intention to filter autocompletions for person names,
There is increasing evidence that autocompletions play
an important role in spreading fake news and propaganda.
Query suggestions actively direct users to fake content on
the web, even when they are not looking for it [22]. Exam-
ples include completions like “Did the holocaust happen”,
which if selected, returned as its top result a link to the
neo-Nazi site stormfront.org [7]. Bad publicity will usually
persuade Google to remove such autocompletions. In 2016,
Google announced it removed “are Jews evil” from its auto-
completions, but many similar offensive completions were
still suggested two years later [14]. Removing such com-
pletions is important, because they led people to search for
offensive results that otherwise would not have. Stephens-
Davidowitz [26] showed that in the 12 months following
Google’s removal of “are Jews evil”, approximately 10%
fewer such questions were asked compared to the 12 months
before the removal.
The examples show that query autocompletions can be
harmful if they are based on searches by previous users.
Harmful completions are suggested when ordinary users
seek to expose or confirm rumors and conspiracy theories.
Furthermore, there are indications that harmful query sug-
gestions increasingly result from computational propaganda,
i.e., organizations use bots to game search engines and social
networks [25]. It is not hard to manipulate search autocom-
pletions, as shown by Want et al. [27], who revealed hun-
dreds of thousands of manipulated terms that are promoted
through major search engines.
A destructive feedback loop
Misinformation and morally unacceptable query comple-
tions are not only introduced by the searches of previous
users, they are also mutually reinforced by the search engine
and its users. When a query autocompletion algorithm sug-
gests morally unacceptable queries, users are likely to select
those, even if the users are only confused or stunned by the
suggestion. But how does the search engine ever learn it was
wrong? It might not ever. As soon as the system determined
that some queries are recommended; they are more of them
selected by users, which in turn makes the queries end up
in the training data that the search engine uses to train it’s
future query autocompletion algorithms. Such a destructive
feedback loop is one of the features of aWeapon of Math De-
struction, a term coined by O’Neil [20] to describe harmful
statistical models.
O’Neil sums up three elements of a Weapon of Math De-
struction: Damage, Opacity, and Scale. Indeed, the damage
caused by query autocompletion algorithms is extensively
discussed in the previous section. Query autocompletion
algorithms are opaque because they are based on the propri-
etary, previous searches known only by the search engine.
If run by a search engine that has a big market share, the
query completion algorithm also scales to a large number of
users. Query autocompletions of a search engine with a ma-
jority market share in a country might substantially alter the
opinion of the country’s citizens, for instance, a substantial
number of people will start to doubt whether the holocaust
really happened.
Structure of the paper
This paper is structured as follows. In Section , we de-
scribe a simple but powerful approach that trains query auto-
completions using the content that is indexed by the search
engine by extracting anchor texts from a large web crawl.
Section compares these content-based query autocomple-
tions to collaborative query autocompletions based on query
logs. Section concludes the paper.
AVOIDING MORALLY UNACCEPTABLE
RESULTS USING CONTENT-BASED
AUTOCOMPLETIONS
It is instructive to view a query autocompletion algorithm
as a recommender system, that is, the search engine recom-
mends queries based on some input. Recommender systems
are usually classified into two categories based on how rec-
ommendations are made [1]:
1. Collaborative recommendations, and
2. Content-based recommendations.
Collaborative query autocompletions are based on similar-
ities between users: “People that typed this prefix often
searched for: . . . ”. Content-based query autocompletions
are based on similarities with the content: “Web pages that
contain this prefix are often about: . . . ”.
Until now, we only discussed collaborative query auto-
completion algorithms. What would a content-based query
autocompletion algorithm look like? Bhatia et al. [6] pro-
posed a system that generates autocompletions by using all
N-grams of order 1, 2 and 3 (that is single words, word
pairs, and word triples) from the documents. They tested
their content-based autocompletions on newspaper data and
on data from ubuntuforums.org. Instead of N-gram models
from all text, Kraft and Zien [13] built models for query
reformulation solely from the anchor texts, the clickable
texts from hyperlinks in web pages. Interestingly, Dang and
Croft [10] argue that anchor text can be an effective substi-
tute for query logs. They studied the use of anchor texts
for a range of query reformulation techniques, including
query-based stemming and query reformulation, treating the
anchor texts as if it were a query log.
Inspired by research of Bhatia et al. [6], Kraft and Zien
[13], and Dang and Croft [10], we obtain query autocom-
pletions from the anchor texts of web pages, and test how
well these autocompletions predict full queries from a large
query log of a web search engine, given a query prefix.
COLLABORATIVE VS. CONTENT-BASED
AUTOCOMPLETIONS
In this section, we answer the question: Are query sug-
gestions from anchor texts any good compared to query
suggestions from query logs? To evaluate this, we used
the query log of Pass et al. [21], which contains 20 million
queries submitted by about 650,000 users to the AOL search
engine between March and May in 2006. Following the
recent query autocompletion experiments by Cai et al. [8],
we used queries submitted before 8 May 2006 as training
queries and queries submitted afterwards as test queries. We
removed queries containing URL substrings (‘http:’, ‘https:’,
‘www.’, ‘.com’, ‘.net’, ‘.org’, and ‘.edu’) from both the train-
ing and the test queries. We did not further filter the data
(Cai et al. [8] only kept queries appearing in both partitions).
Because we are not interested in personalization, we put
99% of the users in the training data, and the remaining
1% of the users in the test data. This leaves more than 3.3
million unique training queries and 952 queries for testing
the system. For every test query, we used 10 different pre-
fixes as input to: 1 to 5 characters, and 1 to 5 words. If the
query has less than 5 characters or less than 5 words, we
take the full query as input. For each prefix we measured the
mean reciprocal rank (MRR) of the position for which our
approaches return the full test query. The MRR is calculated
as one divided by the position of the correct result, so it will
be 1 if the correct result is returned first, 0.5 if it is returned
second, etc. We also measured the average number of results
returned for each prefix. The results of autocompletions us-
ing the 3.3 million unique queries from the training data are
presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Quality of autocompletions using query logs
Prefix MRR Returned
1 char 0.026 10.00
2 char 0.072 10.00
3 char 0.135 9.99
4 char 0.181 9.71
5 char 0.227 9.28
1 word 0.271 8.15
2 word 0.354 4.40
3 word 0.365 3.30
4 word 0.365 3.06
5 word 0.366 3.04
Table 1 shows that after typing 3 characters the MRR is
0.135, so the correct suggestion is on average available in the
top 8 results (1/8 = 0.125). After typing 1 word, the MRR is
0.271, i.e., on average the correct suggestion is available in
the top 4 results.
For anchor text completions we ideally would need a large
web crawl from 2006 (the year of the query log). In absence
of such a crawl, we used data from ClueWeb09, a web crawl
of more than 1 billion pages crawled in January and February
2009 by Callan and Hoy [9] at Carnegie Mellon University.
Anchor texts for the English pages in this collection (about
0.5 billion pages) are readily available [11], so we do not
actually need to process the ClueWeb09 web pages them-
selves. Anchor texts with separators (‘.’, ‘?’,‘!’, ‘|’, ‘-’ or
‘;’) followed by a space were split in multiple strings. Text
in braces ‘()’, ‘{}’, ‘[]’ was removed from the strings. We
processed the anchor texts by retaining only suggestions that
occur at least 15 times. This resulted in 46 million unique
suggestions. Performance of the ClueWeb09 anchor text
suggestions is presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Quality of autocompletions using anchor texts
Prefix MRR Returned
1 char 0.006 10.00
2 char 0.025 10.00
3 char 0.066 10.00
4 char 0.123 9.92
5 char 0.180 9.71
1 word 0.251 8.62
2 word 0.415 5.42
3 word 0.440 3.95
4 word 0.443 3.67
5 word 0.443 3.64
Table 2 shows that for queries of 2 words or more (the
average query length in the test data is 2.6), anchor text auto-
completions perform better than query log autocompletions,
up till an MRR of 0.443 (0.366 for query logs). Query log
autocompletions perform better for shorter queries: Anchor
text autocompletions need about one character more than
query log autocompletions to achieve a similar MRR for the
first 5 characters. The source code for running the experi-
ment is available from https://github.com/searsia/
searsiasuggest.
CONCLUSION
Query autocompletions based on anchor text from web
pages perform remarkably well. For queries of more than
one word, they outperform autocompletions that are based
on over two months of query log data. Simply extracting
all anchor texts is really only a first attempt to get well-
performing autocompletions from web content. Ideas to
improve suggestions are: Using linguistic knowledge to get
suggestions from all web page text (for instance using the
Stanford CoreNLP tools [16]), using web knowledge like
PageRank scores and Spam scores1 to improve the quality
of suggestions, and reranking of suggestions by their “query-
ness” using machine learning.
1 PageRank scores and Spam scores are also available for ClueWeb09 [9].
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